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How can a CEO still enhance his or her compensation under the 
supervision of committees in China’s state-owned enterprises? In order to 
have a better management of CEO’s compensation, many of the firms often 
set up compensation committees and audit committees. 
ii
However, in China’s state-owned enterprises, it is quite common that 
many of the committee members take overlap between the two committees,
meanwhile, the CEOs also overlap in committees and nevertheless, even in 
charge himself or herself as a board director. It seems that a CEO may still 
have means and attempt to raise his or her compensation under such 
committees. 
This study focuses on the influence of the overlap of committee members 
and CEOs’ compensation; and the influence of CEO’s overlap and the 
CEO’s compensation. 
The study has found that 1) when committees’ members take overlap 
between compensation committees and audit committee, the CEO’s 
compensation can get lowered. Thus, the overlap of committee members 
does have influence in manage CEO’s compensation. 2) When CEOs 
overlap in compensation committee, the CEOs’ compensation gets lowered. 
iii
3) When a CEO takes overlap tenure as a board director himself, his or her 
compensation gets enhanced, which indicates that CEO compensation can 
still remain at high level, despite of committees’ supervision. 
Finally, it is proved that even committees are set up and committee 
members overlap across, a CEO is still likely to circumvent control and 
attempt to maximize his or her compensation. 
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The <2011 China Salary Report> shows that the income gap among
different groups of enterprises in China is too large:
Chang Feng Lin (2017), through the study of the effectiveness of the pay 
limit order, found that the ‘Salary Restriction 2009’ failed to effectively 
limit the excessive growth of executive pay. In particular, the recessive 
welfare of the executives of state-owned enterprises also constitutes an 
important source of income, which is far higher than the wages of the 
grass-roots employees; on the other hand, it is opaque to the standard of 
salary setting, and some state-owned enterprises are unable to ensure the 
supervision of the public by refusing to disclose the executive compensation 
out of the protection of business secrets.
The management of compensation is linked to the performance of the 
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enterprise, but the effectiveness of the salary design has been questioned in 
the performance decline of the company, the rise of executive compensation, 
among which exists the sticky characteristics (Jackson, 2008; Fang Jun, 
2009)
In order to better motivate the executives, it is necessary to design a 
reasonable compensation mechanism, and the enterprise through the board 
of directors set up a special committee for internal governance, the most 
important of which are the compensation committee and the audit 
committee. The compensation committee is responsible for formulating the 
incentive mechanism and salary policy of the managers. The audit 
committee is responsible for the salary. The rationality of the plan is 
supervised. But, in reality, the special committee virtually does not show 
"specialized" features. It is common that overlapping between members of 
the committee, and some board directors work in two committees at the 
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same time.
In this regard, scholars both domestic and abroad have heated discussions. 
Bhuiyan (2017) and Chandar (2014) suggest that companies with special 
committee members overlap better financial reporting quality than those 
without such overlapping. Further studies have found that there is an 
inverted U relationship between the degree of overlap and the quality of 
financial reporting. Moreover, the internal network of directors from 
overlapping committees will reduce earnings management and CEO 
self-interest.
CEO of some enterprises also serves as directors and other important 
responsibilities, forming the internal relationship network of CEO 
executives.
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Chapter 2: Theory and Hypothesis
2.1 Information advantage
Tilore puts forward the three-level principal agent model of "client 
Supervisor Agent" that directors can improve the incentive effect of CEO 
and indirectly affect company performance by influencing the information 
quality of output.
Since the directors are entrusted with the supervision of managers by 
shareholders. The board of directors, in accordance with the principle of 
power and responsibility, establishes specialized committees to encourage 
and supervise, in which the position of two committees can not only give 
full play to the advantages of the special committee, but also enhance the 
exchange of information between the two committees, so as to improve the 
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rationality of the compensation committees’ system and the effectiveness of 
the supervision in the audit committees. 
First of all, the board directors work together between the board of 
auditors and the compensation committee to obtain more information and 
achieve information spillover effects. The audit committee can strengthen 
the supervisory function of the salary arrangement by obtaining more 
information.
The role of the audit committee is to eliminate the principal-agent 
problem between the CEO and the directors due to information asymmetry, 
reduce the agency cost, identify the authenticity of the information provided 
by the CEO, and clarify the management responsibility of the managers, 
thus motivating the CEO to achieve the purpose of improving the economic 
benefit of the enterprise.
Second, the compensation committee is responsible for the manager's 
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salary arrangement. If the audit committee is concurrent at the same time, 
the information obtained in the process of audit can provide more complete 
knowledge and information for the compensation committee, thus helping 
the compensation committee to adjust and improve the performance 
assessment and pay scheme.
And the financial commissioner in the audit committee has a stronger 
professional judgment on performance information. If they join the 
compensation committee, they will help to identify the defense and 
camouflage in managerial level and create a useful supplement to the 
effectiveness of compensation regulation (Laux and Laux, 2009). Therefore, 
put forward the hypothesis 1:
H1: When committees’ members take overlap between compensation 
committees and audit committee, the CEO’s compensation can get lowered. 
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2.2 The owner's plunder theory
The owner plundering theory holds that CEO has the motive to control 
the members of the board of directors and to plunder the company resources 
as much as possible. Especially in recent years, China has promoted the 
deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises. The measures of letting 
the power and giving out profit make the power of the manager strengthened 
continuously, and further evolve the ‘insider control’ (Quan Xiaofeng, 2010). 
For example, in a state-owned listed company which is controlled by key 
person control mode or insider control, managers may use their influence to 
arrange their "own people" into the board of directors, enter the board of 
directors or get reelected, and this part of the board shows the heart of return 
and reciprocity in attitude and action. Research shows that there is a certain 
correlation between the remuneration of the internal directors and the CEO, 
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which leads to the conspiracy of the directors and the CEO, which puts the 
common interests of the two parties above the interests of the shareholders. 
Moreover, because of the influence of common interests, directors do not 
want to play the role of "iron wrist" and are shown to be friendly and 
friendly in performing their duties. As for CEO's motivation to manipulate 
his own salary, to get a high salary, we need to introduce an egoistic pay 
scheme on the salary Committee and try to looser it on the monitoring 
review. If the directors of these two responsibilities are willing to take
different, or rather, opposite sides, the resistance in the operation will be 
greatly reduced. The overlapping office between the special committees just 
creates such conditions for CEO, if there is no independent compensation 
committee, it looks like CEO is making a pay plan with one hand on a 
salary contract (Williamson, 1985). It is obviously that a low-cost strategy to 
‘buy’ or to cater to his own directors to such a position. Based on this, the 
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hypothesis 2 is proposed. 
H2: When CEOs’ overlap in compensation committee, the CEOs’ 
compensation gets lowered. 
Because CEO himself is motivated by income manipulation, he will 
receive general attention and supervision. Even if a CEO wants to 
manipulate his income, he cannot directly turn to the compensation 
committee. If a CEO is overlapping as a committee member, he will do 
some make up on his own performance assessment so as to increase his 
income. 
Nevertheless, in China's state-owned enterprises, most of the CEO are in 
the board of directors, and even CEO is directly chairman of the board. This 
may bring rise for CEO to take pride and, possibly, lose the justice. It also 
becomes an important means for CEO to manipulate his or her own income, 
which leave us a prejudice that CEO is still well supervised under 
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committees. Suppose that the committees can handle the compensation 
management relatively effectively, meanwhile, a CEO gets restrained while 
overlapping in compensation committee, then overlapping as a board 
director himself or herself might be a crucial way for CEOs to enhance their 
own compensation. He may have greater competence in the board of 
directors to interfere with his own income. Thus, put forward hypothesis 3: 
H3: When a CEO takes overlap tenure as a board director himself, his or her 
compensation gets enhanced. 
Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Samples
The data are derived from the statistical sample of A share listed 
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state-owned companies in China, from the year 2014 to 2016. 
First, eliminate financial industry companies, and take away those 
companies that do not set up compensation committees or audit committees. 
Then, give away those data- missing samples.
Next, eliminate the company year of CEO replacement and CEO salary of 
0. Since the listed companies in China do not disclose CEO remuneration 
separately, the data were from the CSMAR company governance structure 
database, which discloses executive pay, including the names and
specialized duties of executives. In order to eliminate the influence of 
extreme values, variables winsorized on 1% level of continuous, and 928 
observations were finally obtained. 
3.2 Models and Variables 
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Referring to the former literature (Murphy, 2010; Faulkender, 2010; Chen, 
2011; Fang Jun, 2009; Li vian, 2010), the study sets up a level model and a 
differential model of CEO salary to measure the design of CEO incentive by 




Whether the CEO is in the compensation committee or the audit 
committee and whether a CEO acts as a chairman of the board will have a 
certain impact on the decision-making process of the special committee. A 
regression model (3) is constructed to examine the relationship between the 
cross term of Ovlap and X and Salary (delta Salary), in which X represents 
Comp, Audit and Ceodual, and whether CEO serves as the influence of the 
salary Committee, the audit committee, and the chairman as CEO. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8
*b b b b b b b
b b e
= + + + + + +
+ + +
Salary Ovlap Ovlap X Perfom Size Leverage Bsize
Indpen Bovlap
3.3 Descriptions
The descriptive statistics shows as in Table 2. CEO's salary varies widely, 
with a minimum salary of 114 thousand yuan and 200 yuan, a maximum of 
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7 million 197 thousand and 200 yuan, and a standard deviation of 95.709. 
In the sample data, the number of overlapping members of the special 
committee accounted for 41.8% of the number in the two committees. The 
average ratio of the independent directors to the board of directors reached 
36.9%, and the average compensation committee, the audit committee and 
the chairman of the CEO were 24.3%, 15.5%, and 13.5% respectively, 
which shows that CEO is a number of jobs in state-owned enterprises. Table 
3 is a full sample of the results of variable correlation analysis. CEO 
compensation is significantly negatively related to the degree of overlay in 
the special committee, and a significant positive correlation with enterprise 
performance, namely, the overlap of the committee members across in 
committees can lower the CEO’s compensation, which basically supports 




Table 3 Correlation coefficient of main variables
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Note: *, * * and * * * are significant at 10%, 5% and 1%
Chapter 4: Results
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Based on the above models, this study carries out model hypothesis 
testing in turn. The overall results show that CEO compensation (SALARY) 
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is significantly positively correlated with firm performance (PERFOM) at 1% 
level, which shows that a manager’s incentive is significantly related to 
corporate performance in China's state-owned A share listed companies.
Further, this paper has found that OVLAP and CEO compensation 
(SALARY) are significantly negatively related to the level of 5%, indicating 
that the overlap between the audit committee and the compensation 
committee can strengthen the information advantages of the board of 
directors, identify the false information provided by the CEO, and thus 
inhibit the false compensation.
Therefore, H1 shows that the higher the overlap of members in 
compensation committee and the audit committee at the same time, the more 
conducive to the enterprise to strengthen the supervision of the CEO 
behavior, and to achieve better internal governance in the company. Namely, 
as the members’ overlap across between committees rise, the CEO 
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compensation get lowered.
Considering the effect of CEO influence on the relationship between 
committees and CEO compensation, the classification of CEO power is 
classified and divided into three parts. According to whether CEO is in 
charged in three groups as compensation committee, audit committee or 
chairman, the compensation and performance of a CEO is positively related 
at a level of 1%.
Firstly, the situation of CEO overlap in compensation committee is 
analyzed. Model 3 shows that the CEO Commission will strengthen the 
negative adjustment effect of the committee on CEO compensation.
The possible reasons might be found in two aspects: 1) when a CEO is a 
member of the salary Committee, it will be more likely to be "concerned", 
or frequently concerned by the board of auditors at the same time, it will be 
more impartial and even more strict for CEO to make up in compensation, 
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so as to avoid suspicion, avoid being appeared as pride holder, thus aim at 
establishing a positive image of "CEO". 2) for the state-owned enterprise 
CEO, the explicit incentive, such as monetary remuneration, is only part of 
the compensation. There are even other appealing forms of compensation. It 
is more attractive to the implicit incentive such as promotion, so a positive 
image can often get more recognition. Thus, under the prejudice that each of 
the CEO is well supervised by committees, however, it is easy to ignore the 
pride role that a CEO plays in the cupboard. 
Secondly, considering the situation of the CEO audit committee, model 4 
shows that the CEO audit committee will weaken the advantage of the 
information superiority of the special committee, expand the influence of 
the CEO, and make it easier for a higher salary to be loosed in the 
supervision of the rationality of the salary formulation. It shows that the 
effect of CEO is different from different posts. When a CEO serves in 
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compensation committee, the effect of the information advantage between 
the special committees is strengthened, thus hypothesis 2 get supported.
Finally, considering the situation of the board director, a CEO's influence 
is higher than the role of the information advantage. Meanwhile, the CEO’s
compensation is positively related to the degree of overlapping with the 
special committee. The director has the right to nominate the members of 
the special committee, so the conspiracy of the CEO and other directors 
turns possible. A CEO’s compensation gets enhanced when the CEO himself 
or herself serves as a board director. Hypothesis 3 get supported. 
There is a significant positive correlation between the overlay of the 
special committee and the change of salary, which shows that the 
information advantage is more obvious with the deepening of the degree of 
repetition between the special committees, which can correctly distinguish
the real salary of CEO and determine the reasonable incentive contract.
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However, CEO increased the utility when he was a member of the special 
committee, and CEO had a greater influence on the chairman of the board, 
but weakened the information advantage between the special committees.
Chapter 5: Discussion and Future Research
The board of directors is the core of corporate governance. In view of the 
problem of high executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, the 
influence mechanism of special committee setting on CEO compensation is 
considered from the angle of the board of directors, and the role of a CEO 
and the internal network of the board of directors to regulate the 
compensation of CEO is to be further studied.
As the two most important committees of the board of directors - the 
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compensation committee and the audit committee, from the point of view of 
the information advantage, overlapping posts between the two committees 
can eliminate CEO's false compensation and facilitate the formulation of a 
reasonable compensation contract. In reality, the influence of a CEO will 
have different effects on this mechanism. For the CEO of the compensation 
committee, it will be fairer and beneficial for them not to be appealed as 
‘pride’ role when making salary. The concurrent audit committee and 
chairman will take advantage of their power to enhance their own salaries 
and, meanwhile, weaken the role of information superiority.
In addition, when a CEO served as chairman, the overlapping office of 
the specialized committee provided the convenience for the CEO to buy the 
directors, thereby reducing the performance sensitivity of CEO for the high
salary.
Future research can examine other forms of income in CEO. Because 
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CEO's income is not only reflected in the currency, but also in the 
improvement of reputation, status and the improvement of his stock 
holdings, etc. in the company. Therefore, even though CEO's monetary 
income has not improved, has he been promoted in reputation? Did he 
increase the stock in the company? At the same time, whether these invisible
incomes can become the motivation of CEO, whether it can improve the 
sensitivity of CEO to performance, rather, whether it is more conducive to 
the development of the company in the long run. All these problems can be 
discussed in the future studies. 
The conclusions provide important reference and managerial significance 
for China to further deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises and design 
reasonable incentive contracts.
First, clear away the responsibilities of the specialized committee. The 
special committee is set up to solve the distinct responsibilities under 
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different tasks. A certain proportion of the overlap of members can reduce 
the agency costs and promote the sharing of information between the 
formulation and supervision. It is necessary to establish the relevant 
safeguard mechanism, clear the power and obligation, and prevent the 
mutual blame.
Second, the comprehensive deepening reform of state-owned enterprises 
is market-oriented. Most of the executives of state-owned enterprises are 
appointments, and there is a phenomenon of more than one person, which 
may form an internal network of conspiracy between the directors and CEO. 
Therefore, at the same time that the state-owned enterprises are fully limited 
in salary, the next step in salary reform will increase the proportion of 
selected executives in the market, set up and perfect the system of 
professional managers by the market. At the same time, we should establish 
a reasonable legal framework to standardize, truly retain talents through 
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salary incentives, and add vitality to the development of enterprises.
Third, the key to a good salary system is based on performance appraisal, 
linking assessment results with salary incentives. At the same time, the 
proportion of variable pay can be appropriately increased in the design of 
executive compensation, which is not only easy to link with performance, 
but also can reduce enterprise risk. At the same time, for the dual attributes 
of state-owned enterprises, we should design multiple performance 
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